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EC Reforms of Corporate Governance
and Capital Markets Law: Do They
Tackle Insiders' Opportunism?

Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti*

I. INTRODUCTION
Company and capital markets laws are rapidly evolving everywhere:
there are few countries around the world where they have not been the
subject of reform or where at least a reform agenda has not been devised.
There are various reasons for this, both global and local. Among the global
(or common) reasons for reform, two at least deserve to be singled out:
large-scale market crises or prominent economic scandals, and financial
development.
Corporate frauds and stock market collapses are traditionally the main
drivers of company and securities law reforms.1 After major scandals first
erupted in the United States, the U.S. Congress quickly reacted to them with
broad-sweeping reforms.
Policymakers in other countries also felt
compelled to react in a similar way, often even in the absence of local
scandals (or before they erupted). G~rard Hertig has used the term "me too
reforms" to highlight the fact that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 2 had a
ripple effect on company and securities lawmaking.3

* Professor Enriques is a Consob Commissioner and an ECGI Research Associate. Mr.
Gatti is an associate at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, New York. This essay was
prepared for the 2006 Policy Dialogue on Corporate Governance in India, co-organized by
the Indian Ministry of Company Affairs and by the OECD, Delhi, 16-17 February 2006.
We wish to thank Martin Gelter and Marcello Tarabusi for helpful comments to an earlier
draft. Opinions expressed in this article are exclusively the authors' and do not necessarily
reflect those of Consob and/or Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. Usual disclaimers
apply.
1 See generally Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of
Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1997); Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law
Can Do About It, 61 U. PIT. L. R.Ev. 741 (2000).
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (2003) [hereinafter SOX].
3 See Gerard Hertig, On-Going Board Reforms: One Size Fits All and Regulatory
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The second driver of company law reform around the world has to do
with advances in financial economics.
One of the most influential
contributions in this area is the famous series of articles by Andrei Shleifer
and his co-authors on the relevance of company and securities laws to
financial development.
Their influence went far beyond the academic
world: it reached the main international financial and economic institutions
like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")
itself. If law does "matter"-that is, if it is a major driver for financial
development-then bad laws have to be revised and improved in order to
make them more similar to the best ones around.
These drivers of company law reform have been present also within
the European Union ("EU"). The influence of the "law and finance"
theories can especially be seen at the national level, where countries such as
Italy consciously enacted reforms that took the La Porta et al.'s antidirector
rights index as a benchmark for reform.'
At the European Community ("EC") level, the company law reform
agenda was almost empty during the 1990s, or at least the prospect of
having anything meaningful adopted by the European Community in this
area would have seemed highly unlikely at the time.6 Things started to
change in 1999, when the Commission launched an ambitious plan to
integrate EU financial markets through law: the Financial Services Action
Plan ("FSAP" or "the Plan"), 7 which also included measures in the area of
company law and issuers securities regulation. The Plan was effectively
implemented in the following five years and the implementation measures
were even more relevant in scope and content than originally envisaged.
When the financial scandals that spawned SOX erupted in the United
States, EC institutions were already busy implementing the FSAP and
Capture, 21 OXFORD REv. ECON. POL'Y 269, 270 (2005).
4 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Investor Protection and CorporateGovernance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000); Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J.
POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
Corporate GovernanceAround the World, 54 J. FIN. ECON. 471 (1997).
5 See Luca Enriques, Do CorporateLaw Judges Matter? Some Evidence from Milan, 3
EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 765, 779-80 (2002) (showing how, following the 1998 corporate
law reform, Italy impressively improved on the La Porta et al.'s antidirector rights index,
jumping from a score of one to a score of five).
6 See Klaus J. Hopt, Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe?, in THE
CLIFFORD CHANCE MILLENNIUM LECTURES 105, 127 (Basil S. Markesinis ed. 2000)

(describing the "political and other difficulties with company law harmonization"
experienced by the European Commission during the 1990s).
7 Communication of the Commission, FinancialServices: Implementing the Framework

for Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 232 (May 11,
Communication, FinancialServices].

1999) [hereinafter
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investing a lot of time and effort in the company and securities law area.
U.S. scandals provided the occasion to broaden the scope of the European
Community's intervention in company law matters. At the beginning, the
idea was that reforms were needed to prevent the importation of (ever)
suspicious U.S. market practices, such as stock options, from provoking
scandals in Europe as well. After Ahold, Parmalat, and other scandals
erupted in Europe, 8 the case for an "EC SOX-style" intervention became
even more justified in the eyes of European policymakers. There was, to be
sure, one difference between the U.S. Congress' activism and that of the
European Community. While the U.S. Congress acted under at least some
direct pressure from an outraged public wanting a prompt response from
politics at the federal level, in Europe the reaction of the public was smaller
and focused on national, rather than EC, policymakers. 9
Further, the European Community's activism in company law in the
last six years or so has also had a "local" explanation: EC company
legislation dates back mainly from the 1960s and 1970s and has not
changed much since then. As a result, it is widely perceived as a sort of
petrified forest-far too cumbersome for today's businesses and in great
need of a thorough review. In fact, one of the Commission initiatives in the
1990s had been to promote a simplification of EC company law
directives. 10 In the revived spirit of the beginning of this century, the
Commission took a more aggressive stance and started talking, more
broadly, about the modernization of EC (and EU) company law."
As a result, since 2002, the European Community has adopted thirtyfour directives and regulations-a very high number in itself, but also
considering that a total number of twenty-nine directives had been enacted
between 1968 and 2001.12 Of these thirty-four measures, twenty-one deal
with the law of accounting, nine are securities law measures, while the rest
are either core company law measures or at the crossroads between
company law and accounting or securities law.
This essay provides an overview of the most relevant measures
8 See, e.g., Kerry Capell, Gail Edmondson, Carol Matlack, Ariane Sains, Jack Ewing &
Juliane von Reppert-Bismarck, Europe's Old Ways Die Fast, Bus. WK., May 17, 2004.
9 See Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old Europe on PostEnron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 911, 914-15 (2003)
[hereinafter Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges].
10 In October of 1998 the European Commission announced that its Simpler Legislation
for the Internal Market ("SLIM") initiative, launched in May of 1996 to identify ways to
simplify European Union law, would cover company law. See Eddy Wymeersch, European
Company Law: The "Simpler Legislationfor the InternalMarket" (SLIM) Initiative of the
EU Commission 1 (Fin. Law Inst., Working Paper No. 2000-09, 2000), available at
http://www.law.rug.ac.be/fli/WP/WP2000-pdf/wp2000-09.pdf.
1 See infra Parts III and IV.
12 See infra Apx. 1.
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enacted over the last six years in the corporate governance and securities
areas,1 3 with particular attention as to whether and how such measures are
useful to tackle the main corporate governance problem in most economies,
i.e., how to curb the extraction of private benefits of control by dominant
shareholders or other insiders to the detriment of outside investors. Our
focus will be exclusively on listed companies. Part II describes the FSAP
and its output in the securities law field. Part III deals with the post-scandal
initiatives that the European Community took in the accounting area, while
Part IV covers company law reforms. Part V provides a conclusion to the
analysis.
II. THE FSAP AND ITS OUTPUT
The FSAP was launched in 1999 with the aim of promoting a fully
integrated European capital market. It soon became a distinctive symbol of
the ambitious Lisbon strategy, whereby in 2000 the European Council
announced the goal of making Europe the world's leading knowledge-based
economy by 2010.14 The FSAP contains a wide-ranging set of measures
touching upon several fields of EU law, such as securities markets, banking,
pension funds, and insurance. In this Part, we describe the provisions
contained in the FSAP measures dealing with corporate governance issues
that more directly affect dominant shareholders' opportunism. Our focus is
thus on (i) Regulation 1606/2002/EC on the application of international5
accounting and financial reporting standards ("IAS/IFRS Regulation");1
(ii) Directive 2003/6/EC on insider trading and market manipulation (the
Market Abuse Directive, "MAD"); 16 (iii) Directive 2003/71/EC on the
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or
admitted to trading (the Prospectus Directive, "PD"); 17 (iv) Directive
2004/25/EC on takeover bids (the Takeover Bids Directive, "TBD");1 8 and
(v) Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonization of transparency
13For a broader overview of the EC securities law Directives discussed in this article, see
Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, Is There a Uniform EU Securities Law After the Financial
Services Action Plan? (2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract

id=982282 (login required).
14 See Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, (Mar. 23-24, 2000), available
at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-rl .en0.htm.
15Council Regulation 1606/2002, On the Application of International Accounting
Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1 [hereinafter IAS/IFRS Regulation].
16Council Directive 2003/6, On Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market
Abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16 [hereinafter MAD].
17Council Directive 2003/71, On the Prospectus to Be Published When Securities Are
Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading and Amending Directive 2001/34, 2003 O.J. (L
345) 64 [hereinafter PD].
18Council Directive 2004/25, On Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 [hereinafter
TBD].
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requirements with respect to issuers with securities admitted to trading in
regulated markets (the Transparency Directive, "TD").19
A. IAS/IFRS Regulation
The IAS/IFRS Regulation requires EU companies that are listed in a
European regulated market to prepare their consolidated financial
statements in accordance with Intemational Financial Reporting Standards
("IFRS"). 20 The goal is to "ensure a high degree of transparency and
comparability of financial statements and hence an efficient functioning of
the Community capital market and of the Internal Market.",2 1 Member
States have the option to impose the IFRS requirements also with respect to
the preparation of stand-alone accounts and may extend duties to prepare
consolidated and/or stand-alone accounts to non-listed companies.2 2
Two features of IFRS are likely to play a significant role in EU
corporate governance. First, thanks to the fair value principle23 (one of the
cornerstones of IFRS), hidden reserves, which companies of certain EU
countries such as Germany and Italy were once able to accumulate due to
conservative accounting policies, are likely to emerge. As a consequence,
investors should be better able to understand if companies retain excessive
cash in the effort to maximize the size of the firm and the ensuing private
benefits. Thus, agency costs should be reduced.24
However, the new rules on accounting may in some instances actually
decrease the breadth of agency costs. In fact, there are several cases in
which the newly introduced fair value principle is just an alternative to
historical cost accounting.2 5 With the fair value principle, companies are
19Council Directive 2004/109, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 [hereinafter TD].
20 IAS/IFRS Regulation, supra note 15, art. 4.

IFRS were formerly known as IAS

(International Accounting Standards). We refer to them here IAS/IFRS or simply as IFRS or
IAS.
21 IAS/IFRS Regulation, id. art. 1. Comparable, transparent and reliable financial

information was a fundamental goal of the FSAP for an efficient and integrated capital
market. See Communication,FinancialServices, supra note 7, at 7.
22 IAS/IFRS Regulation, supra note 15, art. 5.
23 For an overview of the fair value principle across IFRSs and the definition of "fair
value,"

see KEITH ALFREDSON ET AL., APPLYING INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

29, 171, 383 (2005). For further details on the definition of "fair value" and its recent
amendment, see also International Accounting Standards Board [IASB], Fair Value
Measurements: Principles and Definitions, (Agenda Paper 8A, 2006), available at
http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/B9A519D6-AAF5-4ACF-ABFF-F9958BFE519C/0
/ObNotes_FVM_0605ob08a.pdf.
24 See generally Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate
Finance,and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 323 (1986).
25 See, e.g., International Accounting Standard [IAS] 16.29, Property, Plant and
Equipment (providing that, subsequent to initial recognition at cost, property, plant and
equipment is carried either at cost, less accumulated depreciation and any accumulated

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

28:1 (2007)

ultimately provided with a good degree of freedom in arbitraging between
two valuation methodologies that may lead to different outcomes. This
opportunity for creative accounting may increase agency problems, due to
the possibly greater scope for earnings management.
Second, IAS 2426 will be an important turning point in disclosure of
related party relationships 27 and transactions. In particular, IAS 24 requires
disclosure on: the nature of relationships between parents and subsidiaries,
even if there were no transactions between those related parties; the name of
the entity's parent and, if different, the ultimate controlling party;
compensation of key management personnel; and, if there have been
transactions between related parties, the nature of the relationship and
information about the transactions and outstanding balances with related
Wt IAS
A 24, investors should therefore have a clearer perception
parties. 28 With
of whether and to what extent private benefits of control are being
extracted.
B. Market Abuse Directive
The MAD, together with the level 2 measures implemented by the
European Commission, bans insider trading and market manipulation. The
directive replaces an older directive of 1989 on insider trading 29 and
impairment losses, or at revalued amount, less subsequent accumulated depreciation and any
accumulated impairment losses); similar provisions may be found in IAS 38.72 (an entity
must choose either the cost model or the revaluation model for each class of intangible asset)
and in IAS 40.30 (choice between cost model or fair market value model for investment
property).
26 Commission Regulation 2238/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 394) 47, 110-15 [hereinafter IAS 24]
(International Accounting Standard 24, Related Party Disclosures).
27 According to IAS 24, id. para. 9, a party is related to an entity if it: directly or
indirectly, "controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, the entity;" "has
significant influence over the entity;" "has joint control over the entity;" is a close member
of the family of any individual who controls, or has significant influence or joint control
over, the entity; is an associate of the entity; "is a joint venture in which the entity is a
venturer;" "is a member of the key management personnel of the entity or its parent;" is a
close member of the family of any of the aforementioned key management personnel; "is an
entity that is controlled, jointly controlled or significantly influenced by, or for which
significant voting power in such entity resides with," any of the key management personnel
or their close family members; "is a post-employment benefit plan for the benefit of
employees of the entity," or of any of its related parties.
28 Id. para. 17. According to paragraph 18, all such disclosures must be made separately
for each of the following categories: "the parent; entities with joint control or significant
influence over the entity; subsidiaries; associates; joint ventures in which the entity is a
venturer; key management personnel...; and other related parties." Id. para. 18. According
to paragraph 22, "[i]tems of a similar nature may be disclosed in aggregate except when
separate disclosure is necessary for an understanding of the effects of related party
transactions on the financial statements of the entity." Id. para. 22.
29 Council Directive 89/592, Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, 1989 O.J. (L
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introduces for the first time an EC prohibition on market manipulation. The
MAD is aimed at both preventing and punishing a series of conduct such as
entering into, 30 recommending, or inducing 31 transactions involving
financial instruments on the basis of inside information; unduly disclosing
inside information to third parties (so-called "tipping"); 32 or manipulating
the market through dissemination of false information or various types of
sham transactions.33 The MAD also compels issuers to disclose inside
information that directly relates to them "as soon as possible. 34
There is still some debate among legal and economic commentators on
the very reason why to ban insider trading. 35 The underlying policy
rationale for the prohibition of market manipulation and for mandatory
duties of prompt disclosure of inside information is the interest in
promoting efficient securities markets in which prices are adequately
formed in response to rapid dissemination of information and in which
investors can be confident to invest, with no fear of being cheated. Good
information and public trust rule out adverse selection mechanisms and are
thus considered essential to lower the cost of capital in a given economy.36
It is important to note that the prohibitions on insider trading and
market manipulation alone may well be insufficient in the absence of
adequate sanctions and effective enforcement. On the former aspect, the
MAD is pretty generic, as it simply prescribes that Member States ensure
sanctions that are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive, 37 thus leaving
national legislatures free to choose the type (criminal, administrative, civil),
and the optimal level, of sanctions. As to the enforcement powers of
competent authorities, which is clearly of utmost importance in tackling
market abuses and in particular insider trading,3 8 the MAD provides

334) 30 (EEC).
30 MAD, supra note 16, art. 2, para. 1.
3"Id. art. 3(b).
32Id. art. 3(a) (prohibiting the disclosure of inside information "to any other person
unless disclosure is made in the normal course of the exercise of his employment, profession
or duties").
33Id. art. 1, paras. 2 & 5.
34Id. art. 6, para. 1.
35For an analysis of the pros and cons of prohibiting insider trading, see generally
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Law and Economics of Insider Trading: A Comprehensive

Primer, 61-84, (UCLA School of Law Working Paper Series, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=261277.
36 Cf John C. Coffee Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717 (1984).
37 MAD, supra note 16, art. 14, para. 1.
38See, e.g., Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57
J. FIN. 75, 81 (2002).
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authorities with a robust package of powers.39 In any event, given that
detecting insider trading and all other market abuses is a costly activity,
both economically and politically, the effectiveness of the MAD measures
will largely depend on whether local governments will provide authorities
with adequate support to fight such market violations. In fact, absent a
strong political intent to effectively enforce the underlying provisions, these
powers may prove toothless in certain jurisdictions. Adequate funding of
the relevant authorities-together with a highly motivated, sophisticated,
and well-paid staff-are key factors in the detection of market abuses.
Hence, whether, and how strictly, prohibitions on market abuses are
enforced still depends on national politics.
The MAD also imposes disclosure duties on persons discharging
managerial responsibilities with an issuer when trading on such issuer's
securities. 40 To be sure, the provisions do not seem particularly strict, at
least if compared to the corresponding prescriptions under federal U.S.
law. 41 First, "persons discharging managerial responsibilities" comprise, as
a matter of EC law, only directors and officers, while blockholders are not
included. 42 Second, they are not required to return so-called short-swing
profits to the company.43
Further, the tipping prohibition, which is triggered when an insider
discloses inside information to third parties and such disclosure is not made
in the exercise of the insider's "employment, profession or duties," 44 may

39While the old directive on insider trading was extremely generic with respect to the
powers pertaining to authorities, compare Council Directive 89/592, supra note 29, art. 8(2)
("The competent authorities must be given all supervisory and investigatory powers that are
necessary for the exercise of their functions, where appropriate in collaboration with other
authorities"), the MAD expressly lists a set of minimal powers that authorities must be
provided with. MAD, supra note 16, art. 12, para. 2. According to Article 12, paragraph 2, of
the MAD, each local competent authority shall have "at least the right to: (a) have access to
any document in any form whatsoever, and to receive a copy of it; (b) demand information
from any person, including those who are successively involved in the transmission of orders
or conduct of the operations concerned, as well as their principals, and if necessary, to
summon and hear any such person; (c) carry out on-site inspections; (d) require existing
telephone and existing data traffic records; (e) require the cessation of any practice that is
contrary to the provisions adopted in the implementation of this Directive; (f) suspend
trading of the financial instruments concerned; (g) request the freezing and/or sequestration
of assets; (h) request temporary prohibition of professional activity." Id.
40 MAD, supra note 16, art. 6(4).
41See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2003) (requiring disclosure
of trades also by beneficial owners holding more than ten percent of any class of equity
securities, prohibiting short sales by insiders, and allowing the issuer to recover any "shortswing" profit realized by an insider from any purchase and sale or any sale and purchase
within a timeframe of less than six months).
42 Member States are free to prescribe more stringent provisions.
43 Cf Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 41.

44TBD, supra note 18, art. 3(a).
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have the effect of barring information flows from the company to parent
companies and dominant shareholders. 45 This is an issue that is likely to be
construed differently in the various Member States, depending on local
company law doctrines on the powers of controlling shareholders.
Therefore, different local interpretations with respect to the legitimacy of
disclosing certain inside information to the parent company will not come
as a surprise. In any event, in those Member States where, following the
implementation of the MAD, judges will read the tipping prohibition as
preempting inside information to parent companies, the impact of the MAD
on corporate ownership and control structures will be substantial. In fact, if
a dominant shareholder is not in the position to have lawful access to inside
information relating to the company it controls, holding relevant stakes in
listed companies will be less appealing and the use of the group structure to
control listed companies might become less common than it currently is in
continental Europe. Predicting whether the MAD will ever represent a
turning point in the way corporate ownership and control are shaped in
Europe is obviously impossible at this stage. It might also depend on
whether and how the Committee of European Securities Regulators adopts
a uniform interpretation.
C. Prospectus Directive
Similarly to what IAS/IFRS Regulation imposes to issuers which are
subject to it, in the level 2 measures adopted by the European Commission
to implement the PD, companies are required to disclose details of related
party transactions that they have entered into during the period covered by
the historical financial information and up to the date of the registration
document. If applicable, such information must be disclosed according to
IAS/IFRS Regulation. Otherwise, the issuer must disclose the nature and
extent of material transactions, the amount or percentage to which related
party transactions form part of the turnover of the issuer, the amount of
outstanding loans (including guarantees) and, if applicable, explain the
reasons why the transactions were not at arm's length.
45 To be sure, the old directive on insider trading contained an identically phrased tipping
prohibition. Interestingly, some Member States implemented the rule introducing a different
wording that ultimately allowed more permissive interpretations. For example, Italy
contemplated an exemption to the prohibition in case of a "justified reason" for disclosure of
information (note that both the old directive on insider trading and the MAD grant an
exemption only when disclosure is made "in the normal course of the exercise of his
employment, profession or duties"). This way, arguing from this open-ended exemption,
legal commentators were able to conclude that upstream information flows within groups did
not violate the tipping prohibition. As one of us has noted elsewhere, diverging
implementation and parochial interpretations often make EC law quite different from what it
looks like on the books. Luca Enriques, EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How
TrivialAre They?, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 17-20 (2006).
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D. Takeover Bids Directive

The TBD was adopted after almost fifteen years of negotiations among
Member States and an unprecedented dismissal by the European Parliament
of a former proposal. The compromised outcome, a framework directive
with several options for national legislatures to depart from the EC
standards, largely disappointed those who considered the TBD pivotal for
the creation of a pan-European market for corporate control.4 6 By
providing rules governing the allocation of corporate control, there are
several features of the TBD that are relevant in the perspective of
containing the extraction of private benefits of control by insiders. Our
focus will be on three controversial provisions: the mandatory bid rule
("MBR"), 47 the board neutrality rule ("BNR"), 48 and the break-through rule
("BTR").4 9 We will also mention certain disclosure requirements imposed
by the TBD in order to give investors a clear picture of the contestability of
a company.50
The MBR requires any person acquiring, alone or in concert with other
persons, a percentage of voting rights sufficient to grant control of a
company to make a mandatory bid for all of the voting shares of a company
at an "equitable price," that is, at the highest price paid for the same
securities by the acquirer over a given period prior to the bid. Among the
various justifications that have been put forward by legal and economic
commentators (e.g., equal opportunity for minority investors, fiduciary
duties of controlling shareholders towards minorities, and leveling the
playing field among various EU jurisdictions), one of the most compelling
rationales for the MBR refers to the disincentives that the rule creates for
acquisitions exploiting minority shareholders. Specifically, in companies
with concentrated ownership, given the requirement to provide all
shareholders with the same consideration paid to the selling controlling
shareholder, the MBR screens out transfers of control that may harm
minorities, whereby the goal of the acquirer is to extract private benefits of
control to a larger extent than currently done by the existing controlling
shareholder.51 In companies with widely diffused shares and with control
46 Press Release, Frits Bolkestein, Comments on the Results of the Competitiveness
Council of Ministers, Brussels, (Nov. 27, 2003) (MEMO/03/245, Brussels).
47 TBD, supra note 18, art. 5.

41 Id. arts. 9 & 12.

" Id. arts. I1 & 12.
50 Id. art. 10.

5' The prospective acquirer is compelled to buy shares at the same per-share price paid to
the current controlling shareholder. Given that the price incorporates, among other things,
the consideration for the transfer of the ability to extract private benefits, and that such
consideration may be benefited pro-rata by all minority shareholders, prospective acquirers
cannot get their acquisition gains from the extraction of private benefits of control. This is
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contestable in the market, the MBR represents an obstacle to partial bids
and creeping acquisitions through so-called street sweeps on the market. In
both cases, the ultimate goal is to eliminate, or at least limit, the occurrence
of inefficient acquisitions whereby the acquirer conquers control by
exploiting minority shareholders. To be sure, this deterrence effect has a
downside: not only do the higher costs the MBR imposes on acquisitions
imply a reduction of harmful transactions, but they suggest a reduction of
efficient acquisitions as well.
In any event, the MBR gives Member States wide freedom in carving
out exemptions to the duty to launch a mandatory bid, sets forth criteria on
how to depart from the rule imposing to make the bid at the highest price
paid, does not ban partial bids, and is quite generic in protecting equal
treatment among shareholders within the bid.52 As a result, at least
potentially, the MBR may run the risk of being solely on the books in those
Member States that will implement it loosely, by providing market actors,
one way or the other, with the opportunity to escape it.
Two other distinctive features of the TBD are the BNR and the BTR,
which are considered chief devices for increasing takeover activity, as they
both aim to neutralize anti-takeover defenses.
The BNR compels a target company's directors to obtain a prior
shareholders' authorization when engaging in defensive actions to preserve
the company's independence. Supporters of the rule highlight that board
neutrality prohibits conflicted incumbent management from raising
obstacles to hostile takeovers, which in turn are considered beneficial as
they promote synergies and economies of scale or scope, sanction
inefficient management teams and put pressure on managers to work harder
in order to keep stock prices high (thus avoiding, or limiting, the risk of
By impeding management entrenchment
becoming a target in the future).
and facilitating hostile takeovers, which are considered effective and
spontaneous market devices for the reduction of agency costs between
shareholders and managers in widely held firms, the BNR plays an
important role in corporate governance.
The BTR, whose proposal was first advanced in the Report of the High
because if all minority shareholders tender, there will be no one from whom the new
controller will be able to extract wealth. Rather, the ability to better manage the firm is the
only purpose that, under the MBR, should motivate an acquisition. See generally Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q.J. ECON. 957 (1994);
Einer R. Elhauge, The TriggeringFunction of Sale of ControlDoctrine, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
1465 (1992).
52 Luca Enriques, The Mandatory Bid Rule in the Proposed EC Takeover Directive:
Harmonization as Rent-Seeking?, in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE
767, 776-79 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004).
53 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 171-73 (1991).
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54
Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids
as a device with which to create a "level playing field" for shareholders
around the different legal systems in the European Union, seeks to promote,
inter alia, a principle of proportionality between risk bearing capital and
control. In order to make corporate control of European companies more
contestable, the BTR contains several provisions aimed at making certain
pre-bid defenses, such as differential share structures (multiple voting
shares, capped or time-phased voting restrictions, or non-voting shares), or
restrictions on transfers of shares ineffective vis-d-vis a bidder.
Particularly:
(i) Restrictions on the transfer of securities provided for in the articles
of association of the target company, or in shareholders' agreements
relating to the company and entered into after the approval of the TBD, do
not apply to the bidder during the bid period; 55
(ii) Restrictions on voting rights (with the exclusion of restrictions that
are compensated by specific pecuniary advantages) provided for in the
articles of association of the target company, or in shareholders' agreements
relating to the company and entered into after the approval of the TBD, do
not have effect at the general meeting of shareholders resolving upon
In such a meeting, multiple-vote securities carry only
defensive measures.
56
one vote each;
(iii) Where, following a bid, the bidder holds seventy-five percent or
more of the capital carrying voting rights, no restrictions on the transfer of
securities or on voting rights nor any extraordinary rights of shareholders
concerning the appointment or removal of board members provided for in
the articles of association of the target company shall apply and multiplevote securities shall carry only one vote each at the first general meeting of
shareholders following the bid, called by the bidder to amend the articles of
association or to remove or appoint board members.5 7
Both the BNR and the BTR have raised substantial debate for the
adoption of the TBD. The BNR gave rise to strong hostility from certain
Member States (Germany in particular) that were worried that their
"national champions" would end up being taken over by foreign companies
not facing similar duties of board neutrality. 58 The BTR encountered wide

54 European Commission, High Level Group of Company Law Experts, Report of the

High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, Brussels, at
21-22 (Jan. 10, 2002) (Brussels) [hereinafter Takeover Bids Report].
55
TBD, supra note 18, art. 11, para. 2.
56
57

Id. art. 11, para. 3.

Id. art. 11, para. 4.
58This is not the only criticism that the BNR has historically generated. According to

some authors, limiting managerial response is unwarranted, as often times takeovers come at
the expense of weak constituencies, which might well be protected by directors.

Cf
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opposition from both Member States and interested parties on two main
grounds: first, it imposes a big cost in terms of flexibility and freedom of

contract among companies and investors in the market; and second, it
creates incentives for substituting differential voting structures with
functionally equivalent pyramidal structures.59

Due to criticism and as a political compromise necessary to overcome
resistances by some Member States and thus to have the TBD eventually
approved, neither the BNR nor the BTR are mandatory. According to the
TBD, Member States have the option to introduce a reciprocity provision

and, most importantly, to choose whether or not to implement any such
provision and, in the negative, must provide companies with the option to

enact any of them on a voluntary basis.60 As a consequence, the impact of

both the rules, at least as a matter of pure EC law, is trivial. 6' Indeed, so far
in the biggest markets-the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italyeach of the regimes adopted, or soon to be adopted, is different from the

Margaret Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247 (1999); Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to
Professor Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2002); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and
Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413 (1986); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H.
Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES (A.J. Auerbach ed., 1988). Others claim that the BNR is dangerous because
it can generate collateral reactions in some Member States aimed at rendering takeovers
more difficult by way of various types of administrative obstacles. See Christian Kirchner &
Richard W. Painter, Takeover Defenses Under Delaware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth EU
Directive and the New German Takeover Law: Comparison and Recommendations for
Reform, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 451, 471-72 (2002). Another line of thought criticizes the BNR
on the basis that takeover defenses and board response might represent useful tools against
coercive bids and creeping acquisitions. Cf Jennifer Arlen, Designing Mechanisms to
Govern Takeover Defense: Private Contracting, Legal Intervention, and Unforseen
Contingencies, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 917 (2002); William Carney, Shareholder Coordination
Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against FiduciaryDuties, 2 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 341 (1983).
59 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, A Threat to Dual Class Shares, FIN.
TIMES (U.S.), May 31, 2002, at 11; Luca Enriques, Silence Is Golden: The European
Company Statute as a Catalystfor Company Law Arbitrage, 4 J. CORP. L. STUD. 77, 93-94
(2004); Guido Ferrarini, Share Ownership, Takeover Law and the Contestability of
Corporate Control 6 (Ctr. for Law & Fin., Working Paper Series, WP 1-2001, 2001),
available at http://www.giuri.unige.it/cedif/WP%201-2001 %20-%20G.%2OFerrarini.pdf.
60 TBD, supra note 18, art. 12.
61Cf Enriques, supra note 45, at 18-19. In any event, as one of us has noted elsewhere,
notwithstanding the criticism toward the compromised solution enacted by the EC
legislature, optionality represents a sound approach with regard to the BTR, as the beneficial
impact of the rule is still highly debated among commentators, and is a good compromise for
the gradual implementation of the BNR: quite plausibly, at this stage, an abrupt introduction
of a mandatory BNR would have generated, at least in some Member States, a backlash in
both national politics and corporate practice. Matteo Gatti, Optionality Arrangements and
Reciprocity in the European Takeover Directive, 6 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 553 (2005).
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others, and have essentially left things where they were prior to the TBD
(with the notable exception of the reciprocity feature in France), and the
implementation of the TBD will lead to four different takeover regimes
across the European Union. 62
In any event, whether or not they are subject to a harsh statutory

regime with respect to takeover defenses, companies are required to give
full detail in their annual reports on a set of aspects affecting their
contestability in the market for corporate control, such as the presence of
takeover defenses or devices that can be used as takeover defenses.63 The
underlying rationale is that these transparency duties signal to investors the
degree of contestability of a given company and this is likely to push issuers
to adopt optimal arrangements in order to avoid undervaluation of their
stock. In other words, the provision aims at leaving up to the market
whether to punish the adoption of excessive barriers to changes of control.64
E. Transparency Directive
Following a very similar rationale, the TD contains a set of disclosure
62 See Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the Implementation of the
Directive on Takeover Bids, at 12, SEC (2007) 268 (Feb. 21, 2007) (showing that (i) the
United Kingdom adopted the board-neutrality rule, but not the break-through rule, nor the
reciprocity option, (ii) France has adopted the board neutrality rule and the reciprocity
option, but not the break-through rule, and (iii) Germany adopted the reciprocity option only
and neither the board neutrality nor the break-though rule). Aside from the patterns sub (i),
(ii), (iii) above, a fourth regime has been adopted by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and is
expected to be adopted in Italy. These are the only countries that have opted (or are about to
opt) into the whole package provided by the EC, by adopting the BNR and the BTR.
63 Cf TBD, supra note 18, art. 10. According to the rule, companies are required to
provide information with respect to: (a) their capital structure, with description of the
different classes of shares and, for each class of shares, the rights and obligations attaching
to it and the percentage of total share capital that it represents; (b) any restrictions on the
transfer of securities, such as limitations on the holding of securities or the need to obtain the
approval of the company or other holders of securities; (c) significant direct and indirect
shareholdings (including indirect shareholdings through pyramid structures and crossshareholdings); (d) the holders of any securities with special control rights and a description
of those rights; (e) the system of control of any employee share scheme where the control
rights are not exercised directly by the employees; (f) any restrictions on voting rights, such
as limitations of the voting rights of holders of a given percentage or number of votes, timephased voting rights; (g) any agreements between shareholders which are known to the
company and may result in restrictions on the transfer of securities and/or voting rights; (h)
the rules governing the appointment and replacement of board members and the amendment
of the articles of association; (i) the powers of board membcrs, and in particular the power to
issue or buy back shares; (j) any significant agreements to which the company is a party and
which take effect, alter or terminate upon a change of control of the company following a
takeover bid; and (k) any agreements between the company and its board members or
employees providing for compensation if they resign or are made redundant without valid
reason or if their employment ceases because of a takeover bid.
64 Cf Takeover Bids Report, supra note 54, at 25-26.

EC Corporate Governance
28:1 (2007)
duties applicable to significant holders of shares admitted to trading on a
regulated market, as well as to issuers of those shares. Shareholders are
required to promptly notify companies upon acquisitions or disposals of
shares as a result of which they reach, exceed or fall below certain relevant
thresholds of voting rights.6 5 Shareholders are also required to make such
notifications publicly available.6 6 In this respect, the TD amends and
replaces the similar duties provided for in a 2001 directive.67 What is worth
mentioning here is that, while the lowest threshold under the old EC regime
was ten percent, the TD extends information duties to holdings of five
percent of the voting rights, in line with the prescriptions of the federal U.S.
legislature.68 Even if at first sight one might conclude that these stricter
disclosure duties better protect outside investors who can benefit from a
clearer picture of the ownership structure of a company, it should be
reminded that harsh disclosure duties on significant holdings have chilling
effects on takeover activity: all else equal, strict disclosure duties limit
expected returns for prospective bidders, thus reducing their incentives to
bid.69 As a consequence, such disclosure requirements might end up
harming investors.
The TD also prescribes that issuers "shall ensure that all the facilities
and information necessary to enable holders of shares to exercise their
rights are available. 70
In particular, companies are required to: "(a)
provide information on the place, time and agenda of meetings, the total
number of shares and voting rights and the rights of holders to participate in
meetings; (b) make available a proxy form ... to each person entitled to
vote at a shareholders' meeting or, on request, after announcement of the
meeting; (c) designate as [their] agent a financial institution through which
shareholders may exercise their financial rights; and (d) [provide
information] concerning the allocation and payment of dividends and the
issue of new shares. 7 1 Meeting certain conditions, companies are allowed
to use electronic means to convey such information to shareholders.72 All
these protections have been broadened by the directive on shareholders'
rights. We will revisit this issue in Part IV.

65Cf TD, supra note 19, arts. 9-16.
66

Id. art. 12, para. 6.
Council Directive 2001/34, Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange

67Cf

Listing and On Information to Be Published on Those Securities, arts. 89-95, 2001 O.J.
(L 184) 1 (EC).
68
69

Member States are free to set lower thresholds. TD, supra note 19, art. 9, para. 1.

See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate

Control,94 J. POL. ECON. 461 (1986).
70 TD,

71 Id.

supra note 19, art. 17, para. 2.

72Id. para. 3.
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Pursuant to the TD and proposed level two measures, companies with
shares admitted to trading on a regulated market are also subject to certain
reporting duties (including disclosure on related party transactions) with
respect to annual and half-yearly reports, as well as, if they have no duty to
issue quarterly reports under national rules or listing requirements, interim
management statements.7 3 Similar to what the SOX has imposed with
respect to issuers registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), 74 the TD requires that annual and half-yearly financial reports
must be certified by the persons responsible within the company.7 5 This
ideally leads us to the next part of this article, which takes into account
post-scandal initiatives..
III. THE POST-SCANDAL INITIATIVES
After the Enron scandal erupted, European politicians' reactions were
ambivalent. On the one hand, they were keen to claim that corporate
governance in Europe works better than in the United States, claiming their
part of the credit for this. 76 On the other hand, they saw U.S. corporate
scandals as providing plenty of justification for a review and possibly a
reform of at least some areas of corporate governance, especially the
In other
auditing function and the role of the accounting profession.
words, U.S. corporate scandals have provided an occasion for "political
activism" within the Euro ean Union, at the European Community as well
as at the national level.' ° This second reaction has of course gained
momentum as large-scale scandals such as Parmalat have come to light
within the European Union.
The European Community was quick to move after the Enron scandal
broke. In April 2002, taking advantage of the existence of the High Level

73 Id. arts. 4-6. See also Commission Directive 2007/14, art. 4, Laying Down Detailed
Rules for the Implementation of Certain Provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC on the
Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information about Issuers
Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market, 2007 O.J. (L 69) 27

(EC).

74 See SOX, supra note 2, § 7241.
75 TD, supra note 19, art. 4, para. 2(c) & art. 5, para. 2(c). See also id. art. 7.

See Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges,supra note 9, at 912-13.
id.
78 In the European Commission's words, "[e]arning the right to be recognized as at least
'equivalent' alongside other national and international rules [is] a legitimate and useful end
in itself." Communicationfrom the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European
Union-A Plan to Move Forward, at 5, COM (2003) 284 (May 21, 2003) [hereinafter
Modernizing], available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/
2003/com2003_0284en01 .pdf.
76

77
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Group of Company Law Experts ("the Group"), 79 the European Council and

the EC Commission asked the Group to "review further corporate
governance and auditing issues in the light of the Enron case. 8 °
The Group issued its report on company law in November 2002. The
report covered most corporate governance topics and, reflecting the fact that
company law and corporate governance practices widely differ from
member state to member state, called for little, but significant legislative
action by the European Community. While the report suggested that the
European Community
should mainly focus on issuing soft-law
"recommendations" ' 8' on corporate governance, it also urged the adoption of
a number of rules in the form of hard-law EC directives. For instance, in
the Group's view, listed companies should be required to include in their
annual report a corporate governance statement providing information, inter
alia, about the operation of the board and its committees, the role and
qualifications of individual board members, the system of risk management
applied by the company, and related party transactions.8 2 The Group further
recommended that companies should be given a choice between a one-tier
and a two-tier board structure,83 and responsibility for financial statements
and for statements on key non-financial data should be attributed to all
board members, consistent with a rule already in place in many Member
States.84

On May 25, 2003, the European Commission issued a Communication
to the Council and the European Parliament setting out its agenda to
modernize European company law and to enhance corporate governance in
the European Union.85 The Communication (also known as the Company
Law Action Plan) planned to adopt a wide set of measures covering a broad
range of issues, like corporate governance, disclosure requirements,
shareholder communication and voting rights, minority shareholder rights,
and so on.
In the last three years, the EC institutions have taken measures to
79 The Group had originally been set up in September 2001 in order to help the
Commission prepare a new proposal for a takeover directive and "to define new priorities for
the broader future development of company law in the European Union." European
Commission, High Level Group of Company Law Experts [the Group], Report of the High
Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Frameworkfor Company
Law in Europe, at 128 (Nov. 4, 2002) (Brussels) [hereinafter Modern Regulatory Framework
Report], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/company/docs/modem
/report-en.pdf.
80 See id. at 129.
81
Id. at 46.
82 ld.

3 Id. at 59.

84 Id. at 67.

85 Modernizing, supra note 78.
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implement the Company Law Action Plan. With respect to corporate
issues, the
Commission has issued three
governance-related
recommendations 86 and proposed four directives, all of which have been
enacted already.
Recommendations are non-binding acts by the EC Commission, the
effectiveness of which relies on moral suasion and greatly varies from case
to case.
Although at times disregarded by Member States,
recommendations function as warnings, explicitly or implicitly threatening
hard law initiatives in case Member States do not follow suit. The
recommendations' main impact, however, is in the national policy
discussions. If the content of the recommendations fits the policy agenda of
policymakers (or lobbying groups) at the national level, the policymakers
may be able to increase the chances that the desired policy measures will be
adopted; otherwise, these recommendations will easily be ignored.
The three recommendations deal with auditors' independence (most of
their contents have already been transfused in the proposal for a Directive
on statutory audits that is very close to adoption),87 the remuneration of
directors, and the role of non-executive directors. Predictably, the latter two
measures stand little chance to ever become "hard" EC law, as they deal
with aspects that are not the matter of legislation in most Member States
themselves. Additionally, it would be difficult to adopt a single policy
choice on issues in which practices vary quite broadly across Member
States and across companies. At this stage, it is also too early to tell
whether and to what extent Member States have taken any follow-up
steps. 88 Hence, it is impossible to assess these recommendations' relevance.
Among the four directives enacted thus far, the one on statutory audit
and the one revising the accounting directives are more clearly connected
with the American and European scandals of the past few years.
A. The Directive on Statutory Audit
The directive on statutory audit is an overhaul of the EC legal
framework for auditing with a strong focus on auditors' independence, an
86

See Commission Recommendation 2002/590, Statutory Auditors' Independence in the

EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles, 2002 O.J. (L 191) 22 (EC); Commission
Recommendation 2004/913, Fostering an Appropriate Regime for the Remuneration of
Directors of Listed Companies, 2005 O.J. (L 385) 55 (EC); Commission Recommendation
2005/162, On the Role of Non-Executive or Supervisory Directors of Listed Companies and
on the Committees of the (Supervisory) Board, 2005 O.J. (L 52) 51 (EC).
87 See infra Part III.A.
88In both cases Member States were "invited to take the necessary measures to promote
the application" of the two recommendations by June 30, 2006. For an analysis of such
recommendations focusing on directors' remuneration issues see Guido Ferrarini & Niamh
Moloney, Executive Remuneration in the EU: The Context for Reform, 21 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL'Y 304 (2005).
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area in which, despite concerted efforts, the European Community had been
previously unable to act due to a lack of political consensus and pressure by
accountants. Following are the four major changes in the EC framework
for statutory audit following the new directive:
1. Public Oversight. Member States are required to set up "an
effective system of public oversight for statutory auditors and audit firms,"
much along the lines of (and clearly inspired by) the SOX Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board. 89
2. Auditors' Independence. New provisions aimed to grant auditors'

independence vis-6-vis their audit clients are introduced:
a. First, there is a prohibition to carry out a statutory audit in the
presence of "any direct or indirect financial, business, employment
or other relationship between the statutory auditor, audit firm or
network.., and the audited entity from which an objective,
reasonable and informed third party would conclude that the
statutory auditor's or audit firm's independence is compromised;"
in case of threats to their independence, auditors and audit firms
have to "apply safeguards in order to mitigate those threats;" if "the
significance of the threats compared to the safeguards applied is
such that the independence is compromised, the statutory auditor or
the audit firm shall not carry out the statutory audit;" 90
b. To ensure the auditor's or audit firm's independence of
management, the decision to appoint them is given to the general
meeting of shareholders of the audited entity; however, alternative
systems or modalities for the appointment are allowed, if Member
States so provide, so long as the independence of the auditor or
audit firm is ensured; 9' further, "statutory auditors or audit firms
may only be dismissed where there are proper grounds" and
information on dismissal has to be promptly disclosed92 to the
authority in charge of supervising auditors and audit firms;
c. For "public entities" (for listed companies) there is a requirement
that annual disclosure is provided to the audit committee of the
audited entity as to any additional services provided to the
company, and that issues of independence are discussed with the

89Compare Council Directive 2006/43, Statutory Audits of Annual Accounts and
Consolidated Accounts, art. 32(1), 2006 O.J. (L 157) 87, 100 (EC) [hereinafter Directive on
Statutory Audits] (amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and repealing
Council Directive 84/253/EEC), with SOX, supra note 2, § 7211 (creating the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board).
90 Directive on Statutory Audits, supra note 89, art. 22(2).
9'Id. art. 37.
92 Id. art. 38.
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93

d. The rotation
of key audit partners is made mandatory after seven
94
years;
e. A cooling-off period of two years is introduced, during which the
statutory auditor or the key audit partner95may not take up a key
management position in the audited entity;
f. The annual accounts of the audited company have to disclose
separately "the total fees for the financial year charged by the
statutory auditor or audit firm for the statutory audit of annual
accounts, the total fees charged for other assurance services, the
total fees charged for tax advisory services and the total fees
charged for other non-audit services. 96
3. Reinforcing the Statutory Audit. In order to strengthen the statutory
audit, new requirements on how to conduct them are introduced:
a. First, similar to what the European Community has done with
regard to international accounting standards, the European
Community has decided to adopt generally accepted international
auditing standards 97
98 by means of EC legislative measures
implementing them;
b. Second, the auditor in charge of the statutory audit of consolidated
accounts "bears the full responsibility for the audit report in relation
with the consolidated accounts" and must review the audit work
performed by third country (i.e. extra-EU-based) auditors. 99
4. Audit Committees. Finally, the Directive on Statutory Audits also
dictates rules on audit committees of public interest entities (listed
companies), requiring them (unless they are small or medium-sized
enterprises as defined in Article 2(l)(f) of the PD) to have one. 100 The audit
committee has to be composed of non-executives and at least one of them
has to be independent (with no definition of independence being

IId.

art. 42(1).

9" Id. art. 42(2).

9' Id. art 42(3).
96 Id. art. 49(l)(a).

97 Although no explicit mention is made to them, the EC will predictably turn to the
International Standards on Auditing developed by the International Federation of
Accountants.
98Directive on Statutory Audits, supra note 89, art. 26.
9 Id. art. 27.

100Id. art. 41, para. 1. However, Member States may decide that the provisions of this
article need not apply to any public-interest entity already audited by a body (such as Italy's
board of internal auditors) that performs functions equivalent to those of an audit committee.
Id. art. 41, para. 5.
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provided). 10' The Directive also identifies the key functions of the audit
committee (monitoring the financial reporting process, monitoring the
effectiveness of the company's internal control, monitoring internal audit
and risk management systems, monitoring the statutory audit, "review[ing]
and monitor[ing] the independence of the statutory auditor or audit firm and
02
in particular the provision of additional services to the audited entity,"'
and making the recommendation of the statutory auditor or audit firm on
the basis of which the appointment will be made) 0 3 and provides that the
auditor or the 0audit
firm reports to it on key matters arising from the
4
statutory audit.1
B. The Post-Scandal Revision of the Accounting Directives
In 2006, the European Parliament and the Council approved a directive
bringing changes to EC accounting rules. 10 5 The new measure is aimed to
enhance the degree of transparency and reliability of annual reports by EU
companies as a response to major corporate scandals. It is also a
consequence of a long-standing policy debate on transparency regarding
corporate governance arrangements. Since listed companies are required to
draw annual accounts according to the IFRS (so that the accounting rules to
be found in the accounting directives and amended by the proposed
directive do not apply to them), the relevant innovations boil down to just
two: the requirement that companies issue a corporate governance statement
in their annual reports, and the collective responsibility of directors for
annual accounts.
1. The Corporate Governance Statement. The idea of imposing by law

a corporate governance statement on listed companies stems from a similar
reform introduced in Germany in 2001. Until then, disclosure on corporate
governance practices had been the outcome of self-regulatory initiatives
mainly driven by stock exchanges and institutional investors. 0 6 In such a
setting, disclosure on corporate governance was prompted by the relevant
listing rules.
The European Community has chosen to transform this requirement
into "hard law," perhaps with a view to increase the effectiveness of
101Id. art. 41, para. 1.
102Id. art.

41, para. 2.
41, para. 3.
104Id. art. 41, para. 4.
105Council Directive 2006/46, 2006 O.J. (L 224) 1 (EC) (amending Council Directives
103Id. art.

78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC and 91/674/EEC).
106 Such initiatives were originally a reaction to scandals that occurred in the United
Kingdom some fifteen years ago. See Brian R. Cheffins, Current Trends in Corporate
Governance: Goingfrom London to Milan Via Toronto, 10 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 5, 1617(1999).
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enforcement mechanisms regarding false or misleading statements on
corporate governance arrangements. 07 Under the directive, the corporate
governance statement that listed companies shall include in their annual
report "shall contain at least the following information:
1. A reference to:
(a) the corporate governance code to which the company is
subject, and/or
(b) the corporate governance code, which the company may have
voluntarily decided to apply, and/or
(c) all relevant information about the corporate governance
practices applied beyond the requirements under national law.
2. To the extent to which a company, in accordance with national law,
departs from a corporate governance code referred to under points
(1)(a) or (b), an explanation by the company as to which parts of
the corporate governance code it departs from and the reasons for
doing so. Where the company has decided not to apply any
provisions of a corporate governance code referred to under points
(1)(a) or (b), it shall explain its reasons for doing so;
3. A description of the main features of the company's internal control
and risk management systems in relation to the financial reporting
process;
5. Unless the information is already fully provided for in national laws
or regulations, the operation of the shareholder meeting and its key
powers, and a description of shareholder's rights and how they can
be exercised;
6. The composition and operation of the administrative,
management
10 8
and supervisory bodies and their committees."
The directive also specifies that the statutory auditor must audit the
corporate governance statement with respect to point (3). Point (3) and the
requirement that the relevant statement must be audited come close to the
notorious SOX Section 404, but are significantly more lenient, because no
assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and
procedure has to be made nor, a fortiori, auditors have to report on it. 10 9
2. Collective Responsibility for Annual Accounts. We have already
seen how the SOX emphasis on the specific responsibility of the CEO and
107 On the issue of enforcement of corporate governance codes, see Eddy Wymeersch,
The Enforcement of Corporate GovernanceCodes, 6 J. CORP. L. STUD. 113 (2006).
108 Council Directive 2006/46, supra note 105, art. 1(7), at 4 (amending Council
Directive 78/660, 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11 (EEC) to add Article 46a).
109 See SOX, supra note 2, § 7262.
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the CFO for the annual and quarterly reports has influenced a similar
provision in the TD. 110 The directive contains a provision prescribing, like
many Member States already do,"' the collective responsibility of the
whole board (or boards) in connection with the approval of annual accounts
and reports. Therefore, Member States have to make board members liable
at least toward the company for breach of the duty to ensure that the annual
accounts and report are drawn up and published in accordance with EC
provisions. 112
IV. THE MODERNIZATION OF EC (AND EU) COMPANY LAW
In the aim of modernizing EC as well as national company laws, the
Company Law Action Plan mainly focused on three areas directly
connected with corporate governance: legal capital, which can greatly affect
corporate finance decisions, ownership structures, and shareholders' rights.
This resulted in a revision of the directive on legal capital and a brand new
directive on shareholders' rights. Furthermore, following recent European
Court of Justice ("ECJ") case law on freedom of establishment, 1 3 the EC
legislature
also enacted provisions aimed at facilitating cross-border
1

mergers.

14

A. Legal Capital
One of the priorities in the EC agenda has been the deregulation of
certain capital requirements stemming from the second company law
directive,' 5 which was adopted thirty years ago in a completely different
political and economic context. When enacted, the requirements were
purported to protect creditors from shareholders' opportunism through a
series of procedural rules whose aim was to guarantee that companies are
set up with a minimum level of capital and maintain it during their life.
However, over the years, the legal capital regime had become increasingly
unpopular, mainly because of the doubts that its rule-based system is

110See supra text accompanying notes 67 & 68.
111See European Commission, Board Responsibilities and Improvement of Financial
Information Relating to Financialand Corporate Governance Matters, http://ec.europa.eu
/internalmarket/accounting/board/indexen.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
112Council Directive 2006/46, supra note 105, art. 1(8), at 5 (amending Council
Directive 78/660/EEC to add Article 50c).
113 See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I1459; Case C-208/00, Oberseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH, 2002
E.C.R. 1-9919; Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I10155; Case C-411/03 SEVJCSys. AG v. AmtsgerichtNeuwied, 2005 E.C.R. 1-10805.
114 Council Directive 2005/56, Cross-Border Mergers of Limited Liability Companies,
2005 O.J. (L 301) 1 (EC).
115Council Directive 77/91, 1977 O.J. (L 26) 1 (EEC).
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effectively able to protect creditors, while it certainly gives rise to
inflexibility and administrative costs."16
In parallel, since the end of the 1990s, the European Commission has
been active to revise those aspects of current capital rules that are nowadays
considered too burdensome and ineffective. The European Community has
been working on two fronts: first, in late 2006, it enacted a directive for the
simplification and modernization of the second directive, which is
substantially in line with the Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market17
("SLIM") recommendations as supplemented by the Winter Group;'
second, the European Commission has launched a feasibility study on
alternatives to the capital maintenance regime. While it is premature to
make any guess on whether a radical change of the legal capital system will
occur in the near future, there are a few rules contained in the revised
directive that are worth mentioning here.
First, the directive contains a substantial amendment to the current
prohibition on financial assistance, which may result in bolstering M&A
transactions and in particular leveraged buyouts ("LBOs").
Traditionally, the former Article 23, paragraph 1, of the second
company law directive ("[a] company may not advance funds, nor make
loans, nor provide security, with a view to the acquisition of its shares by a
third party"' 18) was considered an obstacle, or at least a chilling factor, to
LBOs. In fact, if one construed the prohibition as applying not only to
transactions where a company expressly grants assistance to a potential
acquirer, but also to transactions where a company substantially provides
that assistance (in LBOs this was said to typically occur as a result of the
target's merging with the leveraged vehicle set up by the acquirer)," 9 the
financial assistance provision would have barred a significant amount of
116See

John Armour, Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a

Modern Company Law, 63 MOD. L. REV. 355 (2000); Luca Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey,
Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case Against the EuropeanLegal Capital Rules,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 1165 (2001); Peter 0. Mailbert & Max Birke, Legal Capital-Is There a
Case Against the European Legal Capital Rules?, 3 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 695 (2002);
Friedrich Kfibler, The Rules of Capital Under Pressureof the Securities Markets, in CAPITAL
MARKETS AND COMPANY LAW 95 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., Oxford Univ.

Press 2003).
117
See Directive 2006/68, 2006 O.J. (L 264) 32 (EC) (amending Council Directive
77/91/EEC as regards the formation of public limited liability companies and the
maintenance and alteration of their capital).
11 Council Directive 77/91, supra note 115, art. 23, para. 1.
"19 See, e.g., Eddy Wymeersch, Article 23 of the Second Company Law Directive: The
Prohibition on FinancialAssistance to Acquire Shares of the Company, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR
ULRICH DROBNIG ZUM SIEBZIGSTEN GEBURTSTAG 725, 734 (Jirgen Basedow et al. eds. 1998)
[hereinafter Wymeersch, Article 23]; Marco Silvestri, The New Italian Law on Merger
Leveraged Buy-Outs: A Law and Economic Perspective, 6 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 101, 10310 & 114-17 (2005).
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LBO structures.
By exempting certain transactions from the financial assistance
prohibition, so long as certain conditions are met, 20 the amended directive
might well help to make uncertainties and concerns with respect to the legal
feasibility of LBOs disappear and, therefore, to lead to an increase in the
number of acquisitions."" However, the conditions to be met are such that,
as Eilis Ferran has argued, "barring truly exceptional circumstances, no-one
will ever want to use [the proposed gateway procedure] because it is timeconsuming, costly, runs the risk of transaction-disrupting minority
' 22
shareholder actions and exposes directors to excessive personal risks.'
Another interesting aspect of the amended directive is the partial
deregulation of the regime governing purchases by a company of its own
shares. Traditionally, EC law provided for a set of limitations that included,
among other things, the requirement that the purchase be authorized by the
general meeting of shareholders for a period not exceeding eighteen
months, as well as the requirement that purchases of own shares do not
result in the company's owning its shares in excess of ten percent of its
subscribed capital. Under the new rules, the eighteen-month limit is
extended to five years, while Member States are free to eliminate the limit
of ten percent of the subscribed capital. Although the latter will depend on
120 Such conditions include: (i) that the transaction is taken under the responsibility of the
administrative or management body at fair market conditions, "especially with regard to
interest received by the company and with regard to security provided to the company for the
loans and advances referred to in the first subparagraph;" (ii) that the credit standing of the
third party or, in the case of multiparty transactions, of each counterparty thereto are duly
investigated; (iii) that the transaction obtains shareholders' approval following extensive
disclosure of "the reasons for the transaction, the interest of the company in entering into
such a transaction, the conditions on which the transaction is entered into, the risks involved
in the transaction for the liquidity and solvency of the company and the price at which the
third party is to acquire the shares;" and (iv) that the aggregate financial assistance granted to
third parties shall at no time result in the reduction of the net assets below the amount of the
subscribed capital plus undistributable reserves and the company must include, among the
liabilities in the balance sheet, a reserve, unavailable for distribution, of the amount of the
aggregate financial assistance. Cf Council Directive 77/91, supra note 115, art. 23
(amended by Council Directive 2006/68, supra note 117, art. 1).
121 To be sure, given the sheer volume of private equity buy-outs in Europe, the hindering
effect of current Article 23 of the Second company law directive was not as great as often
contended. See Enriques, supra note 43, at 30-31. First, some Member States, and notably
the United Kingdom, had introduced exemptions. Second, in all Member States "intricate...
evasion techniques [had] been invented by smart lawyers," Eddy Wymeersch, About

Techniques of Regulating Companies in the European Union, in REFORMING COMPANY AND
TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE, supra note 52, at 145, 177, which national courts, for better or
for worse, had usually judged to be in line with the prohibition on financial assistance.
Wymeersch, Article 23, supra note 118, at 735, 738-39 (reporting arguments developed in
various Member States in order to construe the prohibition restrictively).
122 Eilis Ferran, Simplification of European Company Law on FinancialAssistance, 6
EUR.

Bus. ORG. L. REv. 93, 99 (2005).
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Member States' choices, both features are likely to boost repurchase
programs and may galvanize investors in pressuring companies to reduce
their cash in excess.
B. "One Share, One Vote" and Pyramidal Structures
An issue that the European Community has been considering whether
to take action on is the so-called battle for shareholder democracy that
purports to ban, or at least limit, dual-class share structures and pyramids.
As to dual-class shares, the European Community's first attempt
missed the target: as noted, the BTR was eventually made optional for
Member States, due to wide political opposition (and significant criticism
from academics). According to EC policymakers, dual-class structures are
dangerous because they do not reflect a principle of proportionality between
risk bearing and control. At this stage, it is far from clear whether the
European Community will eventually take any formal steps; if so, it is
highly unlikely that
it will issue anything more than a non-binding
23
recommendation. 1
Bans on dual-class share structures do not find many supporters among
most legal and financial commentators, who have two main objections:
first, adoptions of dual-class share structures can be adequately assessed
and, if the case, sanctioned by the market, as they trigger higher costs of
capital; second, a mandatory "one share, one vote" principle would trigger
undesirable collateral effects, such as the substitutes that it would generate
to differential voting structures, and the reduction of firms eager to make
access to capital markets. 24 Even embracing the underlying premise that
such structures are always (or most of the times) inefficient, as the
European Community seems to be inclined to hold, a general ban may have
negative effects in terms of fewer firms going public, without being even
capable of eliminating the inefficiencies it purports to get rid of: firms
would most probably switch to functionally equivalent, yet arguably even
more inefficient devices, such as pyramidal structures or crossshareholding. 2 5

123 Cf Charlie McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services,
Company Law Action Plan: Setting Future Priorities (Nov. 14, 2005) (transcript available as
SPEECH/05/683, availableat http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=SPEECH/05/683&format-PDF&aged = 1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en);
European Commission, Report on the ProportionalityPrinciplein the European Union-ISS
Europe, ECGI, Shearman & Sterling, IP/07/751
(Jun. 4, 2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/company/docs/shareholders/study/final-report-en.pdf
(finding no conclusive evidence of a causal link between deviations from the proportionality
principle and either the economic performance of listed companies or their governance).
124 See articles cited, supra note 59.
125 See articles cited, supra note 59.
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Pyramidal structures actually raise more concerns than dual-class
structures, as they represent a more opaque and costly way to separate
However, what makes
controlling rights from cash flow rights.126
legislative initiatives quite problematic in this field (irrespective of whether
they are adopted at the national or at the EC level) is that pyramids are so
complicated to regulate, that any response would likely end up being
overinclusive (as it can dampen efficient uses of group structures) 1 and/or
ineffective (as market participants will likely find loopholes in the
legislation that would allow them to adopt some substitutes). To date, no
formal proposal has been put forward.
C. Facilitating Shareholders' Voting
Another field where the European Community has been very active is
shareholders' voting rights. Drawing on the report by the Group, 128 the
Company Law Action Plan put the enhancement of shareholders' rights in
listed companies as one of its main concerns. 129 Following a lengthy
consultation process, in July 2007, the EC institutions finally adopted a
directive on shareholders' rights, 130 which contains measures governing
shareholders' meetings and the voting process. Among other things, the
directive includes: the right to add items to the agenda and to table draft
resolutions;' 3' provisions concerning the admission to the meeting, with a
ban over share blocking systems 3zand the option for Member States to
introduce record date systems 133 within a maximum period of thirty
calendar days preceding the general meeting; 34 the right to participate in a

See John C. Coates IV, Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable Should
EU CorporationsBe?, in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE, supra note
52, at 677, 690 (noting that pyramids and cross-shareholdings make it more difficult for
126

outside investors to understand, evaluate, and monitor existing controllers).
127

See Guido Ferrarini, European Corporate Governance Harmonisation Plans: A

CriticalAssessment, in

THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

57, 68 (Mats Isaksson &

Rolf Skog eds., 2004) (arguing that "it is often difficult to decide whether a pyramid is

abusive or not").

Modern Regulatory FrameworkReport, supra note 79, at 47-59.
129 See Modernizing,supra note 78, at 14.
130 Council Directive 2007/36, 2007 O.J. (L 184) 17 (EC).
128

131 Id. art.

6 (the said rights must be guaranteed, at least, to holders of five percent of the

share capital of the issuer).
132 Under a share blocking system, in order to be admitted to the meeting, shareholders

must deposit their shares (either at the company's headquarters or at designated institutions)
at a certain date prior to the meeting and cannot dispose their shares in between. Id. art. 7,
para. 1.
133 In a record date system, only shareholders who are registered on the company's stock
ledger as owners of the stock on the record date are entitled to participate to at the meeting.
134

Id. art. 7, para. 2.
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136
35
shareholders' meeting by electronic means;1 the right to ask questions;
measures on proxy voting and the right to vote in absentia;' 37 and
provisions with respect to the management of securities accounts and to
upon instructions from accountholders and postvoting by intermediaries
138
meeting information.

D. Cross-Border Mergers
The EC legislature is also involved in enacting measures that seek to
facilitate cross-border mobility and restructuring: both the directive on
cross-border mergers and the announced proposal for a directive on the
cross-border transfer of the registered office are aimed at removing national
barriers against EU companies' freedom to migrate and, hence, choose
company law.' 39 It is however at least debatable, if we take into account
recent ECJ case law on freedom of establishment, whether these provisions
will really be pivotal in facilitating mobility: only a few days following the
adoption of the directive on cross-border mergers, the ECJ clarified in the
SEVIC case 40 that national provisions restricting the ability for companies
to enter into cross-border mergers violate Articles 43 and 48 of the EC
Treaty. One can thus legitimately wonder whether the directive is
ultimately trivial, as it allows companies to do something that, as a matter
of EC law, has to be permissible in each Member State. Further, given that,
according to the ECJ, even before the directive companies were able to
enter into such cross-border transactions, the only problem for market
players being legal uncertainty, it will be important to assess whether the
benefits of the cross-border mergers directive, in terms of legal certainty
and protection of the relevant stakeholders, will not be offset by the costs
stemming from all the procedural measures it imposes.
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT ROLE FOR EC LAW IN TACKLING
INSIDERS' OPPORTUNISM?
These have been busy times for EC policymakers dealing with
corporate governance and capital markets issues. We have described what
we think are all of the relevant innovations enacted in this area and selected
a few among those that are still under discussion.
Almost half of the measures enacted between 2002 and 2007 deal with
accounting. It is perhaps too early to evaluate the overall impact of IFRS

Id. art. 8.
Id. art. 9.
Id. arts. 10-12.
138Id. arts. 13 & 14, respectively.
139 Council Directive 2005/56, supra note 114.
140 See Case C-411/03, supra note 113.
'3

136
137

EC CorporateGovernance
28:1 (2007)

on EU companies' accounts and, by implication, corporate governance.
Since enforcement takes place at the Member States level, there is still the
risk that IFRS will be applied and construed differently across the European
Union, that the ensuing degree of comparability of EU companies' annual
accounts will be lower than expected and hence that national practices will
somehow be maintained. However, we believe that IAS 24 is a major
innovation in the field of disclosure of self-dealing (and therefore for the
prevention of a widespread form of "tunneling") and that it greatly
improves on existing accounting methods for such transactions in at least
some of the Member States.
If consistently and strictly applied, some of the new measures may
have an impact on ownership structures across the European Union: the
MAD appears to prevent upstream information flows in groups of
companies, making it more difficult for dominant shareholders to manage a
group of listed companies and in any event to monitor their day-to-day
management, unless they sit on the board of the relevant listed companies
(which, among other things, will make them insiders for the purpose of
trading disclosure requirements).
If adopted, the board neutrality rule would also affect ownership
structures, possibly leading to more concentration of ownership. First,
shareholders having working control of a company or managers themselves
may be tempted to secure a more stable controlling position by building
blocks so as to avoid or limit hostile bids altogether. 41 Second, the fear of
leaving control up for grabs might convince companies to sell smaller
42
stakes at the IPO stage, or to stay away from capital markets upfront.1
Further, board neutrality may work as an incentive for companies to erect
pre-bid defenses. 43 However, certain Member States, including Germany,
Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands, decided not to
adopt the board neutrality rule. It will be interesting to see whether in such
countries we might even gravitate toward the opposite outcome-that of
greater diffusion of ownership-due to44 the enhanced possibility of adopting
defensive tactics against hostile bids. 1
14' Building blocks can either facilitate the approval of defensive tactics by the
shareholders' meeting or, more simply, make the control of the company not contestable to
begin with.
142 Cf Gatti, supra note 61, at 567.
143 See Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, UnregulableDefenses and the Perils of Shareholder
Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577 (2003).
144 To be sure, this will also depend on the extent to which national company law in the
given Member State ultimately allows companies to adopt effective defenses. Cf Jeffrey N.
Gordon, An American Perspectiveon Anti-Takeover Laws in the EU: The German Example,
in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE, supra note 52, at 542, 551 n.23;
MATTEO GATTI, OPA E STRUTTURA DEL MERCATO DEL CONTROLLO SOCIETARIO 100-07 (2004)
(arguing that, in jurisdictions endorsing a shareholder choice approach with respect to
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Further, a number of measures are aimed to strengthen the statutory
audit. Whether this will bring a net benefit to the corporate governance of
EU companies remains to be seen. It will depend on whether the higher
cost of auditing the reforms predictably involved will be more than offset
by the improvements in management processes and decisions that the
reforms also might prompt.
With the exception of the new accounting rules involving adoption of
IAS 24 and of insiders' trading disclosure requirement, 145 rules against
corporate self-dealing are noticeably absent from the EC agenda of
corporate governance reforms for listed companies. While it would be easy
to argue that such an absence is evidence of the failure to address core
corporate governance issues by the European Community, we believe that
inaction on this front is the wisest course of action for EC policymakers. In
fact, as we have already noted elsewhere, the EC legislature would not be a
good actor for the role of providing tougher checks on the extraction of
private benefits of control. 46 First, an EC legislation aimed at reducing
private benefits of control would turn out to be either ineffective (if the
European Community decided to mandate certain standards that local
judges may end up enforcing leniently) or inefficient (if it opted to impose
rules that by definition are destined to be inflexible and both overinclusive
and underinclusive). Second, effective policing of self-dealing is the
outcome not only of a proper regulation, but of several other factors (e.g.,
business culture, economic and social norms, efficiency of the judicial
system), 47 which are beyond the reach of the European Community. A
mere legislative intervention to tighten fiduciary duties EU-wide, which is
per se very unlikely to be adopted because of local resistances, would at
best turn out to be insufficient.

takeover defenses, company law obstacles to so-called structural defenses, such as poison
pills, may result in the adoption of some other value-wasting defense and may therefore end
up harming investors for lack of effective means to counter low-ball offers) (on file with
authors).

145 MAD, supra note 16, art. 6, para. 4.

146 See Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, The Uneasy Casefor Top-Down CorporateLaw
Harmonization in the European Union, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 939,994-95 (2006).
147 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditionsfor Strong
Securities Markets, UCLA L. REv. 781, 804-15 (2001); Guido Ferrarini & Paolo Giudici,
Financial Scandal and the Role of Private Enforcement: The Parmalat Case, in AFTER
ENRON 159 (John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2006); Edward B. Rock, Saints and
Sinners: How Does Delaware CorporateLaw Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rv. 1009 (1997).
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APPENDIX I
EC Company law directives and regulations (Jan. 1, 2002-Aug. 31, 2007)
1. Regulation 1606/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 19 July 2002, as implemented by
2. Commission Regulation 1725/2003 of 29 September 2003 and
Annexes, adopting certain international accounting standards in
accordance with Regulation 606/2002/ EC, as amended by
3. Commission Regulation 707/2004/EC of 6 April 2004;
4. Commission Regulation 2086/2004 of 19 November 2004;
5. Commission Regulation 2236/2004 of 29 December 2004;
6. Commission Regulation 2237/2004 of 29 December 2004;
7. Commission Regulation 2238/2004 of 29 December 2004;
8. Commission Regulation 211/2005 of 4 February 2005;
9. Commission Regulation 1073/2005 of 7 July 2005;
10. Commission Regulation 1751/2005 of 25 October 2005;
11. Commission Regulation 1910/2005 of 8 November 2005;
12. Commission Regulation 1864/2005 of 15 November 2005;
13. Commission Regulation 2106/2005 of 21 December 2005;
14. Commission Regulation 108/2006 of 27 January 2006;
15. Commission Regulation 708/2006 of 8 May 2006;
16. Commission Regulation 1329/2006 of 8 September 2006;
17. Commission Regulation 610/2007 of 1 June 2007:
18. Commission Regulation 611/2007 of 1 June 2007;
19. Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market
abuse) as implemented by
20. Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003
implementing Directive 2003/6/EC as regards the definition
and public disclosure of inside information and the
definition of market manipulation;
21. Commission Regulation (EC) 2273/2003 of 22 December
2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC as regards
exemptions for buy-back programmes and stabilisation of
financial instruments;
22. Commission Directive 2004/72/EC of 29 April 2004
implementing Directive 2003/6/EC as regards accepted
market practices, the definition of inside information in
relation to derivatives on commodities, the drawing up of
lists of insiders, the notification of managers' transactions
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and the notification of suspicious transactions;
23. Council Directive 2003/38/EC of 13 May 2003 amending Directive
78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of certain types of companies as
regards amounts expressed in euro;
24. Directive 2003/5 1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
18 June 2003 amending Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC,
86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the annual and consolidated accounts
of certain types of companies, banks and other financial institutions and
insurance undertakings;
25. Directive 2003/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 July 2003 amending Council Directive 68/151/EEC, as regards
disclosure requirements in respect of certain types of companies;
26. Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are
offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive
2001/34/EC, as implemented by
27. Commission Regulation (EC) 809/2004 of 29 April 2004
implementing Directive 2003/71/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council as regards information
contained in prospectuses as well as the format,
incorporation by reference and publication 49of such
prospectuses and dissemination of advertisements; 1
28. Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
21 April 2004 on takeover bids;
29. Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency
requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities
are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive
148Directive 2003/6/EC, MAD, supra note 16, is also implemented by Commission

Directive 2003/125, 2003 O.J. (L 339) 73 (EC). The latter directive, which implements the
former "as regards the fair presentation of investment recommendations and the disclosure of
conflicts of interest," does not deal with company law issues and is therefore not included in
the list. See also Committee of European Securities Regulators [CESR], Market Abuse
Directive: Level 3-FirstSet of CESR Guidance and Information on the Common Operation
of the Directive, CESR/04-505b, May 11, 2005 available at http://www.cesr-

eu.org/index.php?page=contenugroups&id=22&docmore=1

(scroll down to "11

May.

2005"); CESR, Market Abuse Directive: Level 3-Second Set of CESR Guidance and
Information on the Common Operation of the Directive to the Market, CESR/06-562b, July

12, 2007, available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=contenugroups&id=22
&docmore=l (scroll down to "12 Jul. 2007")
149Commission Regulation 809/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 149) 1 (EC), has been amended by
Commission Regulation 1787/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 337) 17 (EC), which addresses issues
related to the equivalence of third countries accounting standards. See also CESR, CESR's
Recommendations for the Consistent Implementation of the European Commission's
Regulation on ProspectusesNo. 809/2004, CESR/05-054b, Jan. 2005.
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31.
32.

33.

34.

35.

2001/34/EC;
30. Commission Directive 2007/14/EC of 8 March 2007 laying
down detailed rules for the implementation of certain
provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation
of transparency requirements in relation to information
about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a
regulated market.
Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
26 October 2005 on cross-border mergers of limited liability
companies.
Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
17 May 2006 on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated
accounts, amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC
and repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC.
Directive 2006/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
14 June 2006 Amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and
83/349/EEC concerning the annual accounts of certain types of
companies and consolidated accounts.
Directive 2006/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
6 September 2006 amending Council Directive 77/91/EEC as regards
the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance
and alteration of their capital.
Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
11 July 2007 on the Exercise of Certain Rights of Shareholders in
Listed Companies.
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